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Japan’s Renaissance and Its Effect to ASEAN 
 
Syafril Hidayat  Padjadjaran University, Indonesia  
 
 
Abstract 
Japan has developed a new security policy against China in East China Sea, which has 
increased tension in that region. Japan’s new leadership under Shinzo Abe, who has 
conservative political view, has unbeatable policy against China’s hegemony. Abe revised 
Japan Self-Defence Forces role in the Japanese Constitution by making critical amendments 
on particular articles, which should be seen as Japan’s bargaining power against China. The 
two major powers in East China Sea can be seen as security dilemma of other states. Pursuit 
of power and hegemony will influence other major actors in the global world system and also 
small states. Japan’s new security policy is as a renaissance of Japan’s hegemony or pursuit of 
power in East China Sea. By using bargaining model of war, Japan’s security policy will 
determine overall situation in South China Sea or particularly in East China Sea: whether it 
will remain of high threat or balance of threat rather than balance of power, or it will face 
possible conflict in the future. 
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Introduction 
 
China’s airspace claim over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China 
Sea has raised political tensions in the 
region. China showed off its existence as a 
country that was at odds with Japan and the 
West. Seeing China’s offensive pursuit of 
power in the region, Japan quickly 
responded to the situation by taking various 
strategic measures in order to balance. 
Japan performed a symbolic diplomatic step 
with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
historical visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Yasukuni Shrine is the final resting place of 
Japanese wartime heroes, including 
fourteen key figures who took 
responsibility for World War II. This step 
alone had boiled relations with China and 
its allies, which could be seen in the KCNA 
editorial that called Abe 'Asian Hitler' and 
Rodong Sinmun editorial that called Abe 
'maniac militarists' (Kompas, February 6, 
2012, p.10). Abe’s visit to the shrine also 
raised US’s and UK’s responses. Both 
countries paid more respect to China than 
Japan about the political impact of visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine. British's Ambassador 
to Japan suggested Abe not to visit the 
shrine. American Ambassador to Japan also 
suggested Japan not to exacerbate the 
situation which could further raise tensions 
in East Asia. 
Furthermore, Japan had also set up a 
special panel headed by Shunji Yanai, 
former Japanese ambassador to US, which 
discussed about the Japan Self-Defence 
Forces role in the Japanese Constitution. 
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Japan had been avoiding collective defence 
after the World War II. However, the 
current draft proposed that Japan could 
provide assistance to its allies. It was a 
major strategic change of Japanese foreign 
policy, particularly related to the East China 
Sea, and might be expanded to other 
regions such as Southeast Asian because 
Japan’s huge investments and donations in 
the region.  
Even though China and Japan (with the 
US) seemed to be at enmity with each other, 
uniquely the US as Japan’s ally also 
continued to provide assistance to China as 
well as to Japan. The US had been provided 
assistance that led to environmental 
improvement, Tibet issue, and 
democratization on China’s continent. 
USAID assistance had been channeled 
directly to the citizens of China.  
Facing the East China Sea conflict, Japan 
also had to pay such a large order to buy 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The advantage 
was the economic growth that Japan had 
targeted by its expansion in Asia. Besides, 
Japan is also seeking to maintain its trade 
transactions using Yen exchange rate. By 
promoting the growth of the Japanese 
economy, this policy will benefit greatly in 
terms of influence and US support.  
Similarly, Japan will provide an 
opportunity to renew the role and posture 
of its military. On the other hand, China 
will make efforts to expand its military role 
and growing influence of its ideology to 
maintain its national interests. Relations 
between Japan and China, however, remain 
a game of utilizing bargaining power. 
Therefore, it is the most proper to examine 
using bargaining model to measure rivalry 
between those states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual Theory: Bargaining Model 
 
Bargaining model can be said as a new 
model in the analysis of politics and war. 
Although politics and war are two different 
things, but Carl von by Clausewitz had 
expressed that “war is politics by other 
means”. The bargaining model is an 
analytical model that is still being debated 
and still requires interdisciplinary 
enrichment. This model also still needs to be 
tested primarily related to the ability 
estimates, the completion estimates, and the 
exchange of interests between the two rival 
groups (Reiter, 2003).  
The bargaining model is traditionally 
linked closely to the economic behaviour in 
trade. The bargaining process is carried out 
by at least two actors in order to reach 
agreement on a treaty (Kennan & Wilson, 
1993). The bargaining model itself in politics 
and war is a new alternative in the analysis. 
The bargaining model focuses on the 
analysis of the causes, prosecution, 
termination and the consequences in a war 
as a process of theoretical consistency 
(Reiter, 2003).  
All factors are debated scientifically, as 
an integral part altogether or separately. 
Some researchers believe there are possibly 
two, or one, factors in a single case. 
Schelling (1960) focused on the causes, 
while Kecskemeti (1958), Ikle (1991), and 
Pillar (1983) focused on the termination. 
Blainey (1973) studied on the causes and 
consequences (Reiter, 2003). Those point of 
views explain conflicts in Europe and 
Western colonization of Africa and Asia. 
Thomas Schelling (1960) stated that 
conflict situations are essentially bargaining 
situations. So this model is increasingly 
constructed and applied in the dynamics of 
government and legislators in some 
countries (Reiter, 2003). This model still 
requires ongoing enrichment from the 
disciplines of war, International Relations, 
psychology, public policy, etc. The 
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conceptual theory of bargaining model can 
be applied in examining Japanese foreign 
policy reconstruction under Shinzo Abe’s 
administration. 
In the bargaining model, the causes of 
war rest on three conditions, explicitly: 1) 
the absence of an agreement between the 
warring parties, 2) the lack of agreement to 
avoid battle in the future, and 3) inability of 
bargaining to prevent war if the disputed 
items remain unresolved (Fearon, 1995, 
1998).  
To look at Abe’s conservative policy, it 
is more appropriate to use the Realist 
perspective in the study of International 
Relations, in which a state perceives other 
states as threats. Thus, states try to achieve 
balance of power in the international system 
to survive in the midst of the magnitude of 
the pressure / interest of other states. 
 
 
The Absence of an Agreement between 
Japan and China 
 
The cause of Japan’s renaissance was the 
absence of an agreement between China 
and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
after World War II. China had never wanted 
this issue to be resolved through 
international institutions. Even though 
Japan had bought the region, the aerial 
territorial boundaries claimed by Japan and 
China are overlapping.  
On another topic, China has 
continuously been demanding for 
prosecution of Japanese war crimes. But 
Japan considered that the wartime Japanese 
soldiers and officers had been prosecuted 
for their war crimes. Implicitly, Japanese 
protest against China’s and other countries’ 
psychological distress was symbolized by 
Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Prosecutions, in bargaining model, are 
made since war or conflict justified by the 
forces involved.  When the forces try to 
reach one or more tasks such as the 
destruction of the opponents’ will, 
destruction of civilian property and others, 
it is justification of war.  In the case of 
between Japan and China, occupation of 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands unilaterally by 
China or Japan can be seen as justification 
of war and bargaining model is applied.  
Thus the military had been used as part 
of the bargaining process to achieve the 
goals. Even though open conflict between 
Japan and China has never happened yet, 
the Abe’s administration concerns 
regarding China had raised the steps taken 
by Japan leading to a new balance of power. 
Abe’s concerns were well-founded as a 
result of the fact that China had been 
arresting fishermen in the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands and installing its flag on the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands. 
In the bargaining model, termination is 
achieved when: 1) the troops reached a total 
occupation or destruction of the enemy that 
cannot survive as a total of victory 
achievement, and 2) forces can reduce 
uncertainty about the abilities or the 
destruction of the opponent. Those two 
factors have materialized in the form of 
China’s Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) over the Senkaku/Diaoyu.  
Japan assumed that China would 
expand its territory. Abe finally seeked to 
reposition over military and defence policy 
by trying to gradually amend the Japanese 
Constitution’s Article 9 relating to the role 
of the Japan Self-Defence Forces by calling 
for a revision of Article 96 specifying the 
process for making amendments. It can lead 
to a new perspective on the pacific 
constitution that has prevailed so far. Thus 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands seem like 
hotspot for both Japan and China and 
remain having overlapping claim over it. 
In the bargaining model, consequences 
focus more on post-war stability required. 
The longer a war lasts, the longer the peace 
created will last (Smith & Stam, 2002). Yet 
this stage has not happened until now. 
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Retrospective war wounds between the two 
countries had led to no absolute agreement 
over the victims of violence due to war 
between Chinese and Japanese. After war, 
Japan has also been claiming to be a victim 
of war crimes. 
 
 
War May Occur as a Result of Lack of 
Agreement to Avoid Battle in the Future 
 
Foreign policy depends on who holds 
power (Yanyan, 2007:3; Mas’oed, 1994:184). 
During his visit to Washington, Shinzo Abe 
stated that “Japan is back”. With great 
support from the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), Abe has a large curiosity to revise 
the Japanese Constitution’s Article 96 to 
revise Article 9 in the pacific Constitution.  
Public who support the right wing 
groups have high expectations of the Japan 
Self-Defence Forces reformation. The 
Japanese Constitution has been perceived as 
abnormal amidst the complexity of the 
dynamics in the East China Sea and the role 
of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces globally 
(Cooney, 2002). 
Abe acted to increase Japanese 
nationalism by reforming School Education 
Law. Furthermore, Abe will also upgrade 
defense institution into a ministry level. 
Ultimately, Abe will revise the pacific 
Constitution. Aside from these changes, the 
LDP had also submitted a draft of changes 
that could be considered exceeding security 
issues, which were freedom of the press, 
return of the Emperor as Head of State, and 
Japanese nationalism regarding Japanese 
flag and national anthem. These can be seen 
as a form of return to the Meiji Restoration 
Era (1930).  
This policy resulted in the emergence of 
Japanese fascism a decade later in Southeast 
Asia, especially as the prologue of World 
War II in East Asia and Southeast Asia. The 
symbols of resurrection and Japanese 
intentions were manifested in Abe’s visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine. 
As a reminder, Japan had stated that the 
first step of foreign relations with ASEAN 
was based on good intentions and heart-to-
heart relations which had been conducted 
since 1974 and marked by 1977 visit by 
Japanese then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda 
to some ASEAN countries (Green, 
2001:170). Fukuda built confidence that the 
Japan-ASEAN relations would be 
conducted without any desire to restore 
Japan's past hegemony in the region (Green, 
2001). 
 
 
Bargaining Cannot Prevent War if the 
Disputed Items Remain Unresolved 
 
Abe got high support of around 72% 
votes in the last election. Indeed, it showed 
the amount of Japanese people’s interests 
and expectations on his term. Abe programs 
in the field of economics known as 
'Abenomics' had shown progress and 
gained the trust of the Japanese public. The 
program was not only related to economic 
growth but also provided continuation of 
Japan's strategic steps to overcome 
deflation, which previously raised difficulty 
for Japan’s economic growth.  
The deflation brought Abe’s 
administration to execute three arrows 
policy in economy sector, namely: 
increasing efforts to prevent inflation by 
providing grants amounting up to $1.4 
billion; injecting funds amounting up to 
$116 billion (this policy affected Japan’s 
economic growth positively by 4.1% in the 
first quarter of Abe’s term as Prime 
Minister); and developing economic growth 
strategies with emphasis on technology 
development, media, and enhancement of 
the role of female workers.  
Current Abe’s economic policy had been 
predicted earlier. Japan had many 
difficulties in determining the right choice 
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over domestic economic policy and post-
Cold War foreign policy. Japan's global 
economic power had been very efficient and 
it becomes the second largest economic 
power in the world, but its domestic 
economic policies had remained inefficiency 
(Cooney, 2002: Chapter 4). 
On the other hand, Japanese Chief 
Secretary of Cabinet, Yoshihide Suga, had 
demonstrated a rejection to Abe’s policy 
that was considered to be able to shake 
Japan's foreign relations and the situation 
over the East Asian region. Departing from 
the bargaining model, Japan will then seek 
to increase its bargaining power in the eyes 
of China and North Korea.  
The US had granted political support by 
flying a B-52 aircraft over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This showed the 
US’s seriousness in supporting its partners 
in East Asia. This is the beginning of the 
operation procedure to prepare if an 
escalation of the current conflict increases. 
The US had been supporting Japan's efforts 
to strengthen its Self-Defense Forces and 
raised its defense budget. Furthermore, the 
US and Japan will follow further military 
cooperation. 
 
 
Implications for Southeast Asia 
 
Several important figures had warned 
against Abe’s policty. Rene L. 
Pattiradjawane, as quoted in Kompas, 
February 5, 2014. p.10, said that Abe’s 
efforts to increase the defense budget and 
his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine would have 
counterproductive impact on Japan. China 
was not a force to worry because of its 
untested and largely outdated military 
equipments. Surely this worry would 
disappear gradually because of the support 
from the ultra-right Japanese conservatives 
to Abe’s leadership. The view of this group 
is not only aimed at Japanese nationalism 
but will also have implications for Japanese 
pacifist Constitution. 
Japan's efforts for the reconciliation of 
the Japanese-Korean war victims also had 
an influence on its relations with South 
Korea and the US. This reconciliation 
brought Japan to establish diplomatic 
relations with North Korea. However, the 
US is still containing China limited to its 
allies, such as North Korea. 
Amid many pressures from other states, 
especially China, Japan desires for survival 
in order to maintain its sovereignty, 
integrity, and national interests. China and 
North Korea's demands for prosecution of 
Japanese war crimes in the 1950’s Japan-
Korean War and the 1930’s Sino-Japanese 
War and the provision of comfort women 
(geisha) for Japanese troops had given 
psychological pressures for Japan in 
international relations. Even though Japan 
had given compensation, the issues 
remained a burden in its interaction with 
those countries. This situation led Japan to 
prepare for its bargaining position 
internationally. 
Southeast Asia countries are looking 
forward to cooperation with Japan, 
especially in the economic field. The 
ASEAN countries have economic interests 
in Japan’s assistance to spur investment and 
development in their respective countries as 
part of comprehensive relations between 
Japan and ASEAN (Green, 2001:168). With 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
consisting of Southeast and East Asian 
countries with the possibility of Northeast 
Asian countries to join in the future, Japan 
has an opportunity to discuss the security 
dialogue with the partner countries in the 
Southeast Asia region. 
As this region does not have a regional 
great power, ASEAN is easier for Japan to 
conduct international relations with 
compared with other regions. In addition, 
in another region discussions about 
economic and security interests are also 
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high. This makes Japan prefers partnership 
with ASEAN. The establishment warm 
ASEAN—Japan relation has given positive 
impacts on the efforts to suppress Chinese 
hegemony in the region.   
Furthermore, the presence of ARF 
Confidence Building Measures will boost 
regional stability. The downside is that the 
ARF and ASEAN are not a pact / military 
alliance and that co-operation in the face of 
all the worst possibilities in this region has 
not been tested. ASEAN does not have co-
operation in security issues. 
Co-operation among ASEAN countries, 
China, Japan, and South Korea also gives 
rise to competition between Japan’s and 
China’s investments in Southeast Asia. 
Japan’s investment value in this region is 
relatively stable while South Korea’s has 
decreased although not significantly. 
Southeast Asia is an attractive region for 
investment of those two major powers. 
Japan is in need for the market in an effort 
to invigorate the domestic Japanese 
economy.  
However, in the 2011 ASEAN Summit 
in Bali, China announced plan to increase 
its investment to reach $500 billion by 2015. 
China had also established supporting 
devices for its plan by making the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and ASEAN-
China Trade Centre in Beijing. China is also 
providing $10 billion for transportation 
infrastructures in ASEAN countries. On the 
other hand, the value of Japan's trade 
transactions with ASEAN countries is still 
rather large, reaching $160 billion annually, 
and will also influence the region's relations 
with Japan. Those two major powers have 
increased “influence-race” instead of arms 
race in Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN is so attractive but needs to 
maintain neutrality over the influence of the 
two great powers. The diversity of ASEAN 
members’ political dissent and national 
interests requires its members the 
seriousness of the role play amidst the rise 
of Japan, which essentially Japan’s 
renaissance is done more or less to counter 
Chinese hegemony. ASEAN will progress in 
the middle of storms, waves, and cliffs. 
Thus it requires toughness in building its 
bargaining position. ASEAN can also 
prepare for the possibility of future conflicts 
in the East China Sea and South China Sea. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Clausewitz stated that “war is the 
continuation of policy by other means”. 
Japan's domestic political developments has 
resulted in a changing conservative 
orientations and estimates of other state 
actors, especially those in the East China 
Sea and in general in the South China Sea 
region and Asia-Pacific. 
Long historical background of Japanese 
fascism in Asia-Pacific region will lead to 
the effort of balance of power. States will 
naturally pursue power by combining, 
separating, or non-aligning with the 
existing great powers. It will be possible to 
form alliances or group or another pact. Abe 
still has strong desire to restore Japan by 
amending its Self-Defence Forces roles.  
Japan’s policy in security issues will 
remain a major focus for countries in the 
Asia-Pacific, especially Southeast Asia. With 
the diversity of political views of each state-
actor in Southeast Asia, there will be 
reconfiguration into groups of liberal-
democratic, socialist-communist, and non-
aligned states. Whether this situation will 
lead back to a Cold War-like situation or 
‘Little Cold War’ in Asia-Pacific region is 
still a wait and see. We still have to wait for 
better further developments. 
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